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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	:	Hon.
v.	:	Civil Action No. 23-
\$318,900 SEIZED FROM BANK OF AMERICA ACCOUNT NUMBER XXXXXXXXX4146 HELD IN THE NAME OF PRESTIGE SHIPPING INC.,	:	<u>VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR FORFEITURE IN REM</u>
Defendant <i>in rem</i>.	:	

Plaintiff the United States of America, by its attorney, Philip R. Sellinger, United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey, for its verified complaint (the “Complaint”) alleges, upon information and belief, as follows:

I. NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. This action is brought by the United States of America seeking the forfeiture *in rem* of \$318,900 seized from Bank of America account number XXXXXXXXX4146 held in the name of Prestige Shipping Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the “Defendant Funds”).

2. The Defendant Funds are subject to forfeiture to the United States of America pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(C) and 984, which subjects to forfeiture all property, real or personal, that constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, which is an offense constituting specified unlawful activity, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7).

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345 and 1355(a).

4. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b)(1)(A) because acts and omissions giving rise to the forfeiture occurred in the District of New Jersey.

5. The Defendant Funds were seized pursuant to a seizure warrant issued on February 27, 2023 by the Honorable James B. Clark, III, United States Magistrate Judge.

6. The Defendant Funds are being held in the CBP-Secret Service forfeiture suspense account held by the United States Treasury.

III. FACTS

7. Trade-Based Money Laundering, commonly referred to as “TBML,” is the use of legitimate trade transactions or networks to disguise the origins of crime proceeds and integrate the funds into the formal economy. Common TBML schemes involve the overvaluing or undervaluing of goods shipped

internationally, where the over- or underpayment lends a façade of legitimacy to sending illegal money from one country to another; multiple invoicing of goods and services; and falsely describing goods and services. One of the red flags for a TBML scheme is a business or trade transaction involving the receipt of payments from third parties who have no apparent connection to the transaction.¹

A. Victim-1

8. On or about January 4, 2023, a 74-year-old woman (“Victim-1”) called the USSS Newark Field Office (hereinafter, “law enforcement”) to report an advance fee scheme. Victim-1 stated that she had met an individual over Facebook (the “Fraudster”) who said that she had won a lottery backed by Facebook. Victim-1 had not entered any such lottery.

9. The Fraudster told Victim-1 that she had to pre-pay taxes and fees in order to claim her prize. This fraudulently induced her to transfer a total of about \$400,000 in cash, in accordance with the Fraudster’s instructions, to accounts in the name of various companies and Bitcoin to private wallets. Victim-1 also sent a photo of her New Jersey driver’s license to the Fraudster as requested.

10. Victim-1 provided law enforcement with receipts and other documents showing payments she made at the Fraudster’s direction. The approximately \$400,000 in payments included seven wire transfers totaling

¹ Financial Action Task Force, Trade-Based Money Laundering 24 (2006).

\$99,000 to Bank of America account number XXXXXXXX4146 (the “BOA Account”) held in the name of Prestige Shipping Inc., a company located in Secaucus, New Jersey (“Prestige”).

11. Bank of America records show the following transfers to the BOA Account from several accounts held by Victim-1 between July 20, 2022 and August 4, 2022:

Transaction Date	Amount	Beneficiary	Originator
07/20/2022	\$30,000	Prestige	Victim-1 (joint account)
07/27/2022	\$10,000	Prestige	Victim-1
07/29/2022	\$ 4,000	Prestige	Victim-1
08/04/2022	\$ 6,000	Prestige	Victim-1 (joint account)
08/05/2022	\$ 9,000	Prestige	f/b/o Victim-1
08/16/2022	\$25,000	Prestige	Victim-1 (joint account)
10/26/2022	\$15,000	Prestige	Victim-1
TOTAL:	\$99,000		

12. After receiving this information, law enforcement contacted Bank of America and relayed the information regarding the fraud on Victim-1. Bank of America temporarily froze the account, which had a balance in excess of \$1 million.

13. On or about January 9, 2023, Prestige’s President contacted law enforcement to discuss the freeze on the BOA Account. Law enforcement spoke with Prestige’s President on several occasions between January 10, 2023 and January 24, 2023, and reviewed documents and records he voluntarily emailed to law enforcement in an effort to prove that the seven wire transfers from Victim-1 were legitimate business receipts.

14. Prestige is engaged in the business of shipping vehicles overseas. A number of the vehicles shipped were damaged in accidents and are sold to customers overseas. Prestige arranges for vehicles to be sent on container ships to customers in Nigeria and other African countries, the Middle East, and Europe.

15. At the request of Prestige's President, law enforcement provided Victim-1's name so he could search Prestige's electronic business records. Prestige's President emailed law enforcement a screenshot from what appeared to be a customer relationship management platform. The screenshot showed all seven wire transfers from Victim-1, but the originator or remitter was listed in this record as a Toronto-based company (the "Toronto Company") rather than Victim-1. Using Bank of America's online banking system, Prestige's President then logged into the BOA Account and entered Victim-1's name as the search term. Prestige's President sent law enforcement a screenshot of the search results, which consisted of the seven wire transfers from Victim-1 to the BOA Account.

16. The Toronto Company is a company in Toronto, Canada that appears to pay Prestige to fulfill overseas orders for cars. Prestige's President told law enforcement that the Toronto Company is his oldest client and provides him with the most volume of business.

17. Prestige's President told law enforcement that Prestige has a "net 60" payment arrangement with the Toronto Company — that is, the Toronto Company has 60 days to make payment after receipt of services or an invoice

— but that the Toronto Company usually takes more than 60 days to reconcile the obligation. Prestige's President said that the Toronto Company pays Prestige by sending either a large payment or several smaller payments to the BOA Account and then, several weeks later, tells Prestige to apply particular deposits to specified obligations. Specifically, the Toronto Company will email Prestige a list with the last five digits of a Prestige invoice in the left column and the amount of money that should be applied to the invoice in the right column. As an example, Prestige's President sent law enforcement this screenshot of an email from the Toronto Company that, according to Prestige's President, tells Prestige how to apply some of the funds wire transferred from Victim-1 to the BOA Account to the Toronto Company's outstanding invoices.

Pasted below is a screenshot of the first few rows of the table:

Re: pls apply

AA Accounting Accounting <accounting@████████>

To: Cc: [Click here to download pictures. To help protect your privacy, Outlook prevented automatic download of this image.](#)

Please apply :

74385	1,280.00
75902	1,200.00
75395	1,500.00
75234	2,070.00
75312	1,380.00
75315	1,380.00
75337	1,380.00
75429	1,280.00
75494	1,280.00
75698	1,700.00
75702	1,380.00
75752	1,380.00
75868	1,280.00

18. Prestige's President also sent law enforcement a spreadsheet, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A,² which shows how Prestige and the Toronto Company applied Victim-1's money to a number of outstanding invoices from Prestige to the Toronto Company. This spreadsheet contains seven groups of transactions, the price (the "Applied Amount" column), and other information. The bottom of the Applied Amount column for each group shows the total, which is in boldface type highlighted in yellow. The highlighted totals for each of the seven groups on Exhibit A correspond exactly to the amounts of the seven wire transfers the Fraudster induced Victim-1 to send to the BOA Account, which are listed in paragraph 10 above.

19. Prestige sent law enforcement other documents pertaining to the transactions listed in Exhibit A, such as invoices, Sea Waybills, Bills of Lading, and invoices from shipping companies with which Prestige contracted. In one of the emails, Prestige's President said that the Toronto Company was one of Prestige's oldest clients. In another, he said that Prestige was not involved in "whatever fraud was perpetrated here" and that he just wanted "to clear this up as soon as possible in order to be able to continue operating the business."

20. In many of the documents Prestige's President provided, and in conversations with Prestige's President, law enforcement saw nothing that would explain how Prestige could use the two-column table discussed and

² Exhibit A has been edited to prevent the seven groupings from breaking across pages and to highlight the sum of each group. The seven sums correspond to the amounts of the seven wire transfers the Fraudster induced Victim-1 to send. In addition, in the third column (Customer Name), the real name of the Toronto Company was replaced with "Toronto Co."

partially screenshotted in paragraph 16 above to come up with the detailed information in Exhibit A, which specifies how Victim-1's money should be applied to particular outstanding invoices. Prestige's President stressed in conversations with law enforcement that this third-party payment practice was customary, and he did not see anything wrong with it.

21. Prestige's President notified a representative from the Toronto Company that its purported payments had been frozen and that federal agents were looking into the transactions.

22. Prestige's President forwarded law enforcement an email from the Toronto Company dated January 12, 2023, which stated that the Toronto Company had notified "the people that know this person and they are asking for written confirmation of the issue and for which transactions."

23. On January 14, 2023, Prestige's President sent law enforcement an email stating the following:

Please see attached copy of the senders ID that was provided to me today by [the Toronto Company]. They have also requested from their respective client that the sender provide us with a notarized letter stating that she intentionally sent the wire transfer on their behalf. From what was explained to me today, the sender had fraud claims with other payments from their account but not for the particular payments that were sent to [Prestige] on behalf of [the Toronto Company]. I cannot verify the accuracy of these statements but figured that the information was worth passing down to you.

The reference to "sender" means Victim-1. The "copy of the senders ID" that was enclosed was Victim-1's New Jersey driver's license, which Victim-1 had previously sent to the Fraudster. In other words,

it appears that the Toronto Company was claiming that Victim-1 was actually a Toronto Company client who was shipping cars overseas, primarily to Nigeria.

24. Just prior to the receipt of the January 14, 2023 email described in the previous paragraph, Victim-1 told law enforcement that she had received a message from the Fraudster requesting that she re-send a copy of her driver's license, which Victim-1 did not do. The Fraudster claimed that someone had tried to hack them, and they needed her driver's license to reinstate Victim-1's account.

25. Prestige's President also sent law enforcement two screenshots of WhatsApp messages between himself and a Toronto Company representative (the "Toronto Company Rep"). The first screenshot contained a photo of Victim-1's driver's license. In a message sent on Saturday, January 21, 2023, Prestige's President asked the Toronto Company Rep whether she was able to get "that letter," which refers to the notarized letter the Toronto Company was trying to get Victim-1 (the Toronto Company's "respective client") to sign stating that Victim-1 intentionally sent the wire transfer on behalf of the Toronto Company. The Toronto Company Rep responded that she was trying to find a notary in New Jersey to take the document to Victim-1's house for signature. Prestige's President provided the Toronto Company Rep with links to mobile notary services. The Toronto Company Rep thanked him and said that she would "pass it to them."

26. Around the time of the WhatsApp messages, Victim-1 told law enforcement that she had received a phone call from a woman who identified herself as the Toronto Company Rep. According to Victim-1, the caller said that she was going to send a mobile notary to Victim-1's house and needed a date and time when Victim-1 would be available. Victim-1 pretended not to know what the Toronto Company Rep was talking about. As far as Victim-1 knows, a mobile notary never came to her house.

27. In a telephone conversation on January 24, 2023, law enforcement asked Prestige's President if he had retained counsel and, if he had done so, to provide the attorney's contact information. Prestige's President sent law enforcement a copy of the retainer fee paid to the attorney. Prestige's President said he billed the Toronto Company for this expense and that the Toronto Company had paid him.

28. According to a January 17, 2023 email exchange between Prestige's President and the Toronto Company, which Prestige's President provided to law enforcement, the Toronto Company also reimbursed Prestige's President \$50,000 of the \$99,000 the government was presumably going to seize from the BOA Account (*i.e.*, the total amount Victim-1 sent to the BOA Account). A January 19, 2023 email from the Toronto Company to Prestige's President indicated that the Toronto Company's owner sent Prestige's President \$49,000 that morning to cover the remaining balance.

B. Victim-2

29. Several individuals have reported to law enforcement that they were fraudulently induced to send money to the BOA Account, among others, while being scammed by a cybercriminal. One such individual, Victim-2, fell victim to a romance scam.

30. In June 2021, an individual identifying himself as “Alain Martin” (“Martin”) sent Victim-2 a friend request on Facebook. Martin claimed to be a widower with two school-aged children. Martin said he was an ophthalmologist at Johns Hopkins and was going to Dubai for three months, where he would be employed by a sheikh to perform eye surgery for a \$375,000 flat fee. Martin said he would leave his elderly parents and children at home in Washington, D.C. while he worked abroad.

31. In July 2021, while Martin was allegedly in Dubai, he began asking Victim-2 for financial assistance. Martin claimed that his credit card was not working, and he needed money for expenses such as medicine, supplies, and fees.

32. Beginning in December 2021, Victim-2 began to send money to Martin in accordance with wire transfer instructions he provided. The transfers Victim-2 sent to Martin between December 1, 2021 and April 22, 2022 are listed in the table below. Martin instructed Victim-2 to send two of the transfers, which totaled \$12,500 and are highlighted below, to the BOA Account.

Date	Amount	Recipient Account
12/01/2021	\$ 5,000	BOA Account
12/06/2021	\$ 8,000	Company 2
12/06/2021	\$ 7,500	BOA Account
01/10/2022	\$ 9,000	Company 3
01/11/2022	\$ 7,000	Company 4
01/12/2022	\$ 6,000	Company 3
01/12/2022	\$ 9,000	Company 4
04/22/2022	\$ 4,500	Company 5
04/22/2022	\$ 5,500	Company 6
TOTAL:	\$61,500	

33. On July 13, 2022, Victim-2 asked a friend to send \$9,000 to Martin on Victim-2's behalf (Victim-2 later repaid her friend). In the "Purpose of Funds" box on the wire request form, the friend wrote "family support." Victim-2 sent law enforcement a copy of the wire transfer request form that shows this transfer from her friend's account at Wells Fargo to the BOA Account, in accordance with Martin's instructions:

Date	Amount
07/13/2022	\$9,000

34. Martin then told Victim-2 that when he flew back to the United States in late November 2021, he was detained at the airport because he was carrying a large amount of cash. Martin claimed he owed legal and other fees to justify the amount of cash he was carrying to the authorities.

35. Martin then began to tell Victim-2 that his elderly father had died, his elderly mother was ill, and he had borrowed money to pay his kids' private school tuition for the 2022-23 school year.

36. On September 12, 2022, a friend of Victim-2 told her that the Alain Martin story was a scam.

C. Money Mule Accounts

37. A “money mule” is someone who transfers or moves illegally acquired money on behalf of someone else. Criminals recruit money mules to help launder proceeds derived from online scams or crimes like human trafficking and drug trafficking. Money mules add layers between the crime and the perpetrators, making it more difficult for law enforcement to trace funds through the financial system. Money mules can be knowingly involved in the criminal activity or can be duped into letting others use their accounts for nefarious purposes.

38. After receiving the information about the BOA Account in January 2023, law enforcement discovered several other instances where the BOA Account was used to effectuate fraudulent transactions.

39. One such instance involved a person living in Virginia Beach, Virginia (the “Virginian”) who had a checking account ending in 1049 and a savings account ending in 1057 at an HSBC Bank branch in McLean, Virginia (the “Virginia Accounts”). A review of the activity in the Virginia Accounts from February 24, 2022 to November 30, 2022 showed 33 transactions conducted between May 5, 2022 and September 14, 2022 that consisted of transfer credits and debits with amounts ranging from \$50 to \$39,000 and totaling \$289,776.

40. The credits to the Virginia Accounts originated from multiple accounts held at other financial institutions, including a cryptocurrency entity. The credits received in the Virginia Accounts were quickly transferred to accounts held at other financial institutions including Evolve Bank and Trust, Fulton Bank, Varo (an online bank), and cryptocurrency entity Payward Ventures, Inc. d/b/a Kraken. Some of the recipient accounts were held in the name of businesses, including the BOA Account.

41. According to records and other information obtained from HSBC Bank, the Virginian is retired, and her source of wealth is her parents and/or other family members. There is no explanation or legitimate business purpose for the rapid movement of funds in and out of the Virginia Accounts.

42. Some of the transfers to the Virginia Accounts originated from account numbers ending in 5508 and 7007 at a First Foundation Bank branch in Irvine, California (the “California Accounts”), which were held in the name of an individual in California (the “Californian”). Between September 8, 2022 and September 12, 2022, two wire transfer credits in the amounts of \$12,850 and \$39,000, for a total amount of \$51,850, were sent from the California Accounts to the Virginian’s HSBC checking account ending in 1049. At different times, the Virginian identified the Californian as her uncle, her brother, and the owner of Prestige. However, according to external sources, there is no familial relationship between the Virginian and the Californian. Moreover, the Californian is not the owner of Prestige and appears to have no official connection to Prestige.

43. From May 31, 2022 to September 12, 2022, the following wire transfers were sent from the Virginia Accounts to the BOA Account:

Date	Amount
05/31/2022	\$25,000
09/09/2022	\$ 6,300
09/12/2022	\$23,000
Total:	\$54,300

44. On September 14 and September 16, 2023, two wire transfers were sent directly from the Californian's account number ending 7007 at First Foundation Bank ("California 7007 Account") to the BOA Account:

Date	Amount
09/14/2022	\$ 121,500
09/16/2022	\$ 35,000
Total:	\$156,500

45. Between September 14, 2022, and September 16, 2022, the funds sent from the California 7007 Account to the BOA Account were withdrawn via ACH transaction, checks, and P2P payments.³

46. The rapid movement of the \$156,500 in and out of the BOA Account showed no apparent business purpose or connection to Prestige's ostensible business.

³ P2P (peer-to-peer) payment systems enable customers to connect their bank accounts to a digital application to instantly send and receive money to and from friends, family, and businesses without the use of cash. PayPal, Venmo, Cash App, and Zelle are popular P2P payment platforms.

V. CLAIM FOR FORFEITURE

47. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 46 of this Complaint are incorporated herein and made part hereof.

48. Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C) subjects to forfeiture all property, real or personal, that constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, which is an offense constituting specified unlawful activity, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7).

49. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 984, in an action for forfeiture *in rem*, the United States is not required to trace directly forfeitable property if (i) the property is fungible property found in the same place or account as the directly forfeitable property and (ii) the action to forfeit the property is commenced within one year from the date of the offense.

50. The transactions in the BOA Account discussed above that were conducted no more than one year from the date of the transaction to the date of this Complaint are summarized in this table:

Transaction	Dates	Amount	Reference
Victim-1	07/30/2022 – 08/04/2022	\$ 99,000	¶ 10
Victim-2	07/13/2022	\$ 9,000	¶ 33
Money Mule	05/31/2022 – 09/12/2022	\$ 54,300	¶ 42
Money Mule	09/14/2022 – 09/16/2022	\$156,600	¶ 43
	TOTAL:	\$318,900	

51. Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant Funds are subject to forfeiture to the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(C) and 984.

WHEREFORE, the United States of America requests that the Clerk of the Court issue a warrant for the arrest and seizure of the Defendant Funds pursuant to Rule G(3)(b)(i) of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the plaintiff will execute upon the Defendant Funds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335(d) and Supplemental Rule G(3)(c); that notice of this action be given to all persons who reasonably appear to be potential claimants to the Defendant Funds; that the Defendant Funds be forfeited and condemned to the United States of America; that the plaintiff be awarded its costs and disbursements in this action; and that the Court grant such other and further relief it deems just and proper.

Dated: May 30, 2023

PHILIP R. SELLINGER
United States Attorney

s/Barbara A. Ward
By: BARBARA A. WARD
Assistant United States Attorney

VERIFICATION

I, Giovanni DeBelli, hereby verify and declare under penalty of perjury that I am a Special Agent with the United States Secret Service; that I have read the foregoing Verified Complaint for Forfeiture *in Rem* and know the contents thereof; and that the matters contained in the Verified Complaint are true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

The sources of my knowledge and the grounds of my belief include the official files and records of the United States; information obtained directly by me; and information supplied to me from and by other law enforcement officials, during an investigation of alleged violations of Title 18, United States Code.

I hereby verify and declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746.

Dated this 30th day of May, 2023.

Giovanni DeBelli

Giovanni DeBelli, Special Agent
United States Secret Service

16726	Wire	10262022f	Toronto Co.	15000	10/26/2022	110001	76775	970	970	2T2KGCCEZ1INC001695
16726	Wire	10262022f	Toronto Co.	15000	10/26/2022	110001	76792	3700	3700	18 pictures,20 pictures,24.5UXFF83568L168171, SADQRICCCNQ16290BEAU5282500
16726	Wire	10262022f	Toronto Co.	15000	10/26/2022	110001	76794	1850	1850	2014 JEEP Wrangler 1C-1CAJWAGEL225863
16726	Wire	10262022f	Toronto Co.	15000	10/26/2022	110001	76801	100	100	J1DKT1UD38CD508774
16726	Wire	10262022f	Toronto Co.	15000	10/26/2022	110001	76802	100	100	5TDIRKECOMS043460
16726	Wire	10262022f	Toronto Co.	15000	10/26/2022	110001	76872	100	100	sav
16726	Wire	10262022f	Toronto Co.	15000	10/26/2022	110001	76872	100	100	12/1
										2T2BKIBA6DC205277

ReceiptID	Receipt Type	Check Number	Customer Name	Receipt Total	Receipt Date	Receipt Bank	Invoice Number	Invoice Total	Applied Amount	Freight Description	VIN	Booking #	Container #
16329	Wire	081620222	Toronto Co.	25000	8/16/2022	110001	72910	1280	1280	2013 HYUNDAI Sonata	5NPF-B4AC8DH603528	SAL569401	
16329	Wire	081620222	Toronto Co.	25000	8/16/2022	110001	72964	8210	8210	2009 TOYOTA Sienna	555WF4KB3HU211090	5TINAM5312171	TCLU5074909
16329	Wire	081620222	Toronto Co.	25000	8/16/2022	110001	73147	1280	1280	2012 NISSAN Quest	JN1JN8AE2KPKX9046936	S322443758	
16329	Wire	081620222	Toronto Co.	25000	8/16/2022	110001	73187	5050	5050	2009 HONDA Accord	II IHGCP26794A021091	2T3NAM5351371	CMAU5975014
16329	Wire	081620222	Toronto Co.	25000	8/16/2022	110001	73189	1730	1730	2013 TOYOTA RAV4	II JTTEHH2V0V030197559	S322451918	
16329	Wire	081620222	Toronto Co.	25000	8/16/2022	110001	73264	1950	1950	2008 TOYOTA Sequoia	5TDZY64A1885001477	S322475496	
16329	Wire	081620222	Toronto Co.	25000	8/16/2022	110001	73397	1380	1380	2017 HONDA Accord	II IHGCR2F39197757	S322504555	
16329	Wire	081620222	Toronto Co.	25000	8/16/2022	110001	73516	1925	1925	2013 BMW X6	UFXFR58UXDF08CS2DL592144	S322547985	
16329	Wire	081620222	Toronto Co.	25000	8/16/2022	110001	73537	2030	2030	2014 TOYOTA Sienna	5TXY2U3LBGG5313849	S322436891	
16329	Wire	081620222	Toronto Co.	25000	8/16/2022	110001	73643	1275	1275	2016 HYUNDAI Santa	F5XY2U3LBGG5313849	S322578653	

EXHIBIT A

Deluxauto Inc requested receipts 2022.xls

ReceiptID	Receipt Type	Check Number	Customer Name	Receipt Total	Receipt Date	Receipt Bank / Invoice Number	Invoice Total	Applied Amnt	Freight Description	VIN	Booking #	Container #
16267	Wire	080520224d	Toronto Co.	9000	8/5/2022	110001	73428	1573	1575	2016 KIA Optima 5XGV4L21GG109936	S322515638	
16267	Wire	080520224d	Toronto Co.	9000	8/5/2022	110001	73449	1500	1500	2014 HYUNDAI Santa Fe 5XVZU3LBXEG159061	S322410801	
16267	Wire	080520224d	Toronto Co.	9000	8/5/2022	110001	73450	1700	1700	2002 TOYOTA Sequoia 5TUBT48A62S093871	S322523186	
16267	Wire	080520224d	Toronto Co.	9000	8/5/2022	110001	73514	1610	1610	141 days,19 pictures,2021 IHGCV3F15LA015049	63828423	HLXU8570742
16267	Wire	080520224d	Toronto Co.	9000	8/5/2022	110001	73552	1575	1575	2003 BMW M3 3.0i WBS WBSBR93423PK04434	S322555016	
16267	Wire	080520224d	Toronto Co.	9000	8/5/2022	110001	73669	1280	1040	2009 MERCEDES-BENZ WDDGF81X89R082825	S322585371	

Total applied**9000**

ReceiptID	Receipt Type	Check Number	Customer Name	Receipt Total	Receipt Date	Receipt Bank / Invoice Number	Invoice Total	Applied Amnt	Freight Description	VIN	Booking #	Container #
16262	Wire	08042022j	Toronto Co.	6000	8/4/2022	110001	73575	1575	1575	2007 MERCEDES-BENZ 4LGBB86E67A201406	S322561837	
16262	Wire	08042022j	Toronto Co.	6000	8/4/2022	110001	73620	1575	1575	2014 MERCEDES-BENZ WDCGG5H1B1E6237263	S322576867	
16262	Wire	08042022j	Toronto Co.	6000	8/4/2022	110001	73821	1280	1280	2011 FORD Edge 2FMDK3GC-BBAA24747	S322614940	
16262	Wire	08042022j	Toronto Co.	6000	8/4/2022	110001	73949	1600	1570	2017 TOYOTA Tacoma 5TFCZ5AN7HX053341	219938244	MSKU4665139

Total applied**6000**

ReceiptID	Receipt Type	Check Number	Customer Name	Receipt Total	Receipt Date	Receipt Bank / Invoice Number	Invoice Total	Applied Amnt	Freight Description	VIN	Booking #	Container #
16231	Wire	07292022d	Toronto Co.	4000	7/29/2022	110001	71478	100	100	100 Houston	JTDDEPRAE5LJ063108	
16231	Wire	07292022d	Toronto Co.	4000	7/29/2022	110001	71690	100	100	4/11	WALLYAFEXAD007959	
16231	Wire	07292022d	Toronto Co.	4000	7/29/2022	110001	71918	100	100	4/21	IVWAA7A39L005457	
16231	Wire	07292022d	Toronto Co.	4000	7/29/2022	110001	71978	310	310	OUT 04/25		
16231	Wire	07292022d	Toronto Co.	4000	7/29/2022	110001	72113	100	100	57/4/29	IFMCU9GXGQUA18908	
16231	Wire	07292022d	Toronto Co.	4000	7/29/2022	110001	72761	100	100	4/7/22	3VY2B7AX3LM017305	
16231	Wire	07292022d	Toronto Co.	4000	7/29/2022	110001	72816	1233	1233	2014 HONDA CR-V 2H2HCRM3H33EH501938	WVGBE7L89D007010	
16231	Wire	07292022d	Toronto Co.	4000	7/29/2022	110001	73164	2000	2000	2019 FORD F-150 1FTEIX1CP7KKD81403	E003791810	

Total applied**4000**

ReceiptID	Receipt Type	Check Number	Customer Name	Receipt Total	Receipt Date	Receipt Bank / Invoice Number	Invoice Total	Applied Amnt	Freight Description	VIN	Booking #	Container #
16218	Wire	07272022c	Toronto Co.	10000	7/27/2022	110001	72339	1485	1485	2011 GMC Terrain 2CTFLRECXB6448057	E003746110	
16218	Wire	07272022c	Toronto Co.	10000	7/27/2022	110001	73117	1280	1280	2009 TOYOTA Sienna 5STUBK23G109802878	S322437800	
16218	Wire	07272022c	Toronto Co.	10000	7/27/2022	110001	73160	1275	1275	2013 TOYOTA Corolla 5YFBU4EE7DP106885	S322444682	
16218	Wire	07272022c	Toronto Co.	10000	7/27/2022	110001	73167	1400	1400	2017 NISSAN Rogue Sp JN1BJJCPOHW00258	S322445139	
16218	Wire	07272022c	Toronto Co.	10000	7/27/2022	110001	73168	1280	1280	2013 MERCEDES-BENZ WDDHF5KB1DA753975	S322445162	
16218	Wire	07272022c	Toronto Co.	10000	7/27/2022	110001	73228	1580	1580	2006 TOYOTA Corolla 1NXXR32E36Z671667	S322468247	
16218	Wire	07272022c	Toronto Co.	10000	7/27/2022	110001	73411	1280	1280	2007 VOLVO XC90 YYV4CY982XT740090	S322510669	
16218	Wire	07272022c	Toronto Co.	10000	7/27/2022	110001	73639	1500	1500	2014 FORD Escape 1FM1FMCU0GXSEUB86119	S322578498	

Total applied**10000**

ReceiptID	Receipt Type	Check Number	Customer Name	Receipt Total	Receipt Date	Receipt Bank	Invoice Number	Invoice Total	Applied Amount	Freight Description	VIN	Booking #		Container #	
												Debit/Exempt	Refund/Exempt		
16183	Wire	07202022g	Toronto Co.	30000	7/20/2022	110001	69357	2010	2010 2008 LEXUS RX 2T2GK272GK31U18C034697	NAM4931530	SEGU5059715				
16183	Wire	07202022g	Toronto Co.	30000	7/20/2022	110001	70059	4700	4700 14 days, 15 pictures	1HGCYV1F16LA095684,	IHCYBKG0237753	TGBU7865613			
16183	Wire	07202022g	Toronto Co.	30000	7/20/2022	110001	71040	1730	1730 2009 ACURA MDX 2HFLH2NYND28209H1005050	S321929190					
16183	Wire	07202022g	Toronto Co.	30000	7/20/2022	110001	71255	1080	1080 2016 BMW X5 UJXTR7CS32856	S321980304					
16183	Wire	07202022g	Toronto Co.	30000	7/20/2022	110001	72322	1780	1780 2016 TOYOTA Camry 4A74BF1FK7GR553805	SAL560209					
16183	Wire	07202022g	Toronto Co.	30000	7/20/2022	110001	72598	2025	2025 2004 LEXUS RX JTICHAJTJGA31U24007808	S322316726					
16183	Wire	07202022g	Toronto Co.	30000	7/20/2022	110001	72627	1480	1480 2016 VOLKSWAGEN T1 WVGEF9BPXGD012142	SAL566412					
16183	Wire	07202022g	Toronto Co.	30000	7/20/2022	110001	72722	1730	1730 2011 MERCEDES-BENZ WDCGG5GFB7B552412	S322351214					
16183	Wire	07202022g	Toronto Co.	30000	7/20/2022	110001	72729	1800	1800 2001 AUDI TT TRUUTTTRUUTT28N11031506	CSNU1353424					
16183	Wire	07202022g	Toronto Co.	30000	7/20/2022	110001	72785	1280	1280 2010 TOYOTA Sienna 515TDYK4CCGAS337474	S322364269					
16183	Wire	07202022g	Toronto Co.	30000	7/20/2022	110001	72854	1280	1280 2007 TOYOTA Sienna 515TDYK23C275014895	S322380388					
16183	Wire	07202022g	Toronto Co.	30000	7/20/2022	110001	72855	1575	1575 2015 TOYOTA Corolla 5TYFBURHESFP3253053	S322380366					
16183	Wire	07202022g	Toronto Co.	30000	7/20/2022	110001	72876	2125	2125 2015 TOYOTA Sienna 515TDYK3DC4FS690277	S322387755					
16183	Wire	07202022g	Toronto Co.	30000	7/20/2022	110001	72924	1280	1280 2006 LEXUS RX 2T2G2A31U46C045113	S322397242					
16183	Wire	07202022g	Toronto Co.	30000	7/20/2022	110001	72994	1280	1280 2014 CHEVROLET Trailblazer 1GNNKVYFED4EJ229363	S32241939					
16183	Wire	07202022g	Toronto Co.	30000	7/20/2022	110001	73011	1315	1315 15 pictures/2020 TOYOTA DEPRAE51L063108	218703817	MSKU943461				
16183	Wire	07202022g	Toronto Co.	30000	7/20/2022	110001	73027	1530	1530 2012 HYUNDAI Santa Fe XYZGDAB6CG149599	S322422544					
												Total applied		30000	